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AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NORTH
CAROLINA v. TATA: MANIPULATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
SPEECH DOCTRINE THROUGH SPECIALTY LICENSE PLATES
KAITLIN E. LEARY ∗
In American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) of North Carolina v. Tata, 1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered
whether specialty license plates bearing the message, “Choose Life,” which
were authorized by the North Carolina General Assembly, constituted private or government speech. 2 The Fourth Circuit employed a four-factor test
developed in an earlier case also concerning specialty license plates and informed by two later United States Supreme Court decisions on the government speech doctrine outside of the specialty license plate context.3 Using
this analysis, the Fourth Circuit found that the Choose Life license plate
implicated private speech interests.4 Therefore, North Carolina engaged in
impermissible viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment by authorizing the Choose Life plate while rejecting a pro-choice specialty license plate.5
The Fourth Circuit in Tata correctly concluded that North Carolina attempted to manipulate the government speech doctrine to prevent the expression of a disfavored viewpoint by claiming private speech as its own.6
However, the court incorrectly interpreted Supreme Court case law on the
government speech doctrine, which resulted in it employing an improper
analysis to address the government speech issue. 7 Instead, the Fourth Circuit should have simplified and reduced its four-factor balancing test into a
dispositive two-element test: the actual and apparent accountability test.8
Under this test, the contested speech is government speech if (1) the gov-

© 2015 Kaitlin E. Leary.
∗
J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The author wishes to thank her editors, Betsy Johnson and Alyssa Domzal, as well as Professor Richard
Boldt, for their feedback and guidance throughout the writing process. She also wishes to thank
her parents, Kathleen and Robert Leary, for their support throughout her academic career, and
Greg Samonds, whose unwavering patience and encouragement made this Note possible.
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ernment controls the content and dissemination of the message, and (2) the
government appears, to a reasonable and fully informed observer, to be the
literal speaker of the message. 9 The existence of these two elements ensures that the government can be held accountable for its speech through the
political process and prevents the government from improperly relying on
the government speech doctrine to suppress disfavored viewpoints in a
speech forum. 10 Therefore, if either element of the actual and apparent accountability test is lacking, the contested speech is that of a private party
and traditional First Amendment protections apply. 11
I. THE CASE
In June 2011, the North Carolina General Assembly passed, and North
Carolina Governor Beverly Perdue signed into law, House Bill 289. 12 The
bill authorized approximately 70 new specialty license plates and brought
the total number of authorized specialty plates in North Carolina to approximately 150. 13 Included among the newly authorized plates was one bearing the message, “Choose Life” (“Choose Life plate”). 14 By the terms of
the statute, the Choose Life plate would cost an individual $25 annually (in
addition to yearly state registration fees), $15 of which would go to the
Carolina Pregnancy Care Fellowship, a private organization that provides
support for crisis pregnancy centers throughout North Carolina. 15 The statute authorizing the Choose Life plate expressly prohibits these funds “from
‘be[ing] distributed to any agency, organization, business, or other entity
that provides, promotes, counsels, or refers to abortion.’”16 The Division of
Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) would be able to develop the plate once it received 300 applications for the Choose Life plate17 through the Carolina

9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part IV.A.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. ACLU of N.C. v. Conti (Conti I), 835 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (E.D.N.C. 2011) (citing Act
effective June 30, 2011, Sess. Law 2011-392, 2011 N.C. Sess. Law 1594).
13. ACLU of N.C. v. Conti (Conti II), 912 F. Supp. 2d 363, 371 (E.D.N.C. 2012) (citing
Sess. Law 2011-392 § (b)(1)), 2011 N.C. Sess. Law 1594), aff’d subnom. ACLU of N.C. v. Tata,
742 F.3d 563 (4th Cir. 2014).
14. Conti I, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 54 (citing Sess. Law 2011-392 § 1(b1)(39), 2011 N.C. Sess.
Laws at 1595) .
15. Id. at 54–55 (citing Sess. Law 2011-392 §§ 4(a), 5, 7(b84), 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at
1604–05, 1607, 1613).
16. Id. at 55 (alteration in original) (quoting Sess. Law 2011-392 § 7(b84), 2011 N.C. Sess.
Laws at 1613).
17. Id. (citing N.C. Sess. Law 2011–392 § 7(b84)).
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Pregnancy Care Fellowship. 18 Once the DMV issued the plate, it could be
purchased by any vehicle owner in North Carolina.19
Only those specialty plates that have been specifically authorized by
the General Assembly are available to North Carolina vehicle owners.20
Unlike many other states, there is no general statute or administrative
scheme through which individuals and organizations can request and obtain
specialty license plates. 21 Thus, during the 2011 Legislative Session, various legislators made six attempts to amend House Bill 289 to include another specialty plate with one of the following messages: “Respect Choice”
or “Trust Women. Respect Choice.” 22 All of those attempts were rejected
by the General Assembly. 23
Thereafter, the ACLU of North Carolina, along with registered North
Carolina vehicle owners who wished to purchase a specialty license plate
displaying a message supporting reproductive choice (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed suit against the Secretary of the North Carolina Department of
Transportation and the Commissioner of the North Carolina DMV (collectively, “the State” or “North Carolina”).24 The Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit the issuance of the Choose Life plates. 25 They
alleged that, by authorizing the Choose Life plate while rejecting a prochoice plate, the State had impermissibly discriminated on the basis of
viewpoint in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 26
In December 2011, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina granted the preliminary injunction.27 The district
court utilized the four-factor test adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Sons of
Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Commissioner of Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (“SCV”) 28 and relied on the factually similar case of Planned
18. Conti II, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 365–66. The Carolina Pregnancy Care Fellowship received
the requisite 300 applications by September 22, 2011. Id. at 366.
19. Conti I, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 55.
20. Id. at 54.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 55.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 54–55. While the case was pending in district court, Eugene Conti held the position
of Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Transportation and Michael Robertson held the
position of Commissioner of the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles. Id. at 54.
25. Id. at 54–55.
26. Id. at 56.
27. Id. at 63.
28. 288 F.3d 610 (4th Cir. 2002). In SCV, the Fourth Circuit considered whether a proposed
specialty license plate for the Sons of Confederate Veterans organization constituted private or
government speech. Id. at 616. Noting that neither the Fourth Circuit nor the Supreme Court had
established a definitive test for answering this question, the court adopted a four-factor test that
had been utilized by other circuits in government speech cases outside of the specialty license
plate context. Id. at 618. The four “instructive” factors are “(1) the central ‘purpose’ of the program in which the speech in question occurs; (2) the degree of ‘editorial control’ exercised by the
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Parenthood of South Carolina, Inc. v. Rose29 in its decision.30 The court
preliminarily concluded that the Choose Life plate did not constitute pure
government speech, 31 and therefore had to comply with the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment. 32 The court rejected the State’s argument
that the Supreme Court had announced a new test for identifying government speech in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n 33 and that SCV and
Rose were no longer good law.34 Instead, the district court found that the
Fourth Circuit had continued to utilize the SCV factors in opinions postdating Johanns and that Johanns was not “wholly applicable in the specialty
license plate context” because Johanns is a compelled subsidy case. 35 The
district court preliminarily agreed with the Plaintiffs’ assertion that the State
had engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination in violation of the
First Amendment, and thus found that the Plaintiffs had met their burden of
establishing a likelihood of success on the merits. 36
government or private entities over the content of the speech; (3) the identity of the ‘literal speaker’; and (4) whether the government or the private entity bears the ‘ultimate responsibility’ for the
content of the speech.” Id.; see infra Part II.B.3.
29. 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004). In Rose, the Fourth Circuit held that the Choose Life plate
authorized by the South Carolina legislature constituted a mixture of private and government
speech and, therefore, the State violated the First Amendment by refusing to authorize a corresponding pro-choice plate. Id. at 794, 799; see infra Part II.B.4.
30. Conti I, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 61.
31. The Fourth Circuit has recognized that the classification of speech as either “government” or “private” is an oversimplification, as some speech may have both government and private characteristics. W. Va. Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d
292, 298 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Rose, 361 F.3d at 794 (“I conclude that SCV’s four-factor test
indicates that both the State and the individual vehicle owner are speaking. . . . Therefore, the
speech here appears to be neither purely government speech nor purely private speech, but a mixture of the two.”); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles,
305 F.3d 241, 244–45 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc)
(“[M]y colleagues have struggled with this case because they have assumed, in oversimplification,
that all speech must be either that of a private individual or that of the government, and that a
speech event cannot be both private and governmental at the same time.”). Other circuits that
have addressed the issue of government speech, as well as the Supreme Court, have yet to recognize the possibility of such “mixed” or “hybrid” speech. However, the Fourth Circuit has determined that “mixed” or “hybrid” speech is treated essentially the same as private speech for First
Amendment purposes. See Rose, 361 F.3d at 799 (“South Carolina has engaged in viewpoint discrimination by allowing only the Choose Life plate . . . . This is prohibited by the First Amendment.”). Since mixed speech is subject to the same constitutional protections as private speech,
this Note will not distinguish between the two. Thus, any speech that is referred to as “private,”
“mixed,” “hybrid,” or “not purely government” speech will be treated as constitutionally equivalent, as distinguished from “pure government” or “government” speech.
32. Conti I, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 61.
33. 544 U.S. 550 (2005). In Johanns, the Supreme Court found that the federal government
established the message of a national beef promotion campaign and effectively controlled the content and dissemination of that message. Id. at 560. Thus, the Court held that the beef campaign
constituted government speech. Id. at 562; see infra Part II.C.1.
34. Conti I, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 58, 61.
35. Id. at 59.
36. Id. at 61.
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In December 2012, the district court granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment and permanently enjoined North Carolina from issuing
the Choose Life plate. 37 The State again argued that Johanns replaced the
four SCV factors with a single-factor test—the control test—for determining
what constitutes government speech, and further asserted “that the Supreme
Court confirmed the use of this test in its decision in” a subsequent case. 38
The district court again rejected this argument, and interpreted Johanns and
Summum “as evaluating factors the Supreme Court deemed relevant to the
particular facts at issue in those cases,” rather than announcing a new test.39
Additionally, North Carolina argued that SCV and Rose were no longer
good law because the Fourth Circuit, in Page v. Lexington County School
District One, 40 applied the two factors articulated in Johanns instead of the
four SCV factors to determine whether the contested speech was that of the
government. 41 Because the Fourth Circuit returned to application of the
four SCV factors in subsequent cases, 42 the State argued that either these
cases were inconsistent, or the Fourth Circuit uses the SCV factors differently in different contexts. 43 In either instance, the State argued, Page
would control the outcome of the instant case.44 The district court rejected
this argument as well, finding that there was no “irreconcilable conflict” between Page and the later cases, and that Page was not so factually similar to
the instant case so as to “dictate [that] this court apply the only two factors
used by the Page court.” 45

37. Conti II, 912 F. Supp. 2d 363, 375 (E.D.N.C. 2012), aff’d subnom. ACLU of N.C. v. Tata, 742 F.3d 563 (4th Cir. 2014).
38. Id. at 368. North Carolina cited Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, which held that
privately donated monuments displayed in a city-owned park qualified as government speech, in
part because the city exercised “‘final approval authority’ over their selection.” 555 U.S. 460, 473
(2009) (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–561); see infra Part II.D.1.
39. Conti II, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 372.
40. 531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008).
41. Conti II, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 373. In Page, the Fourth Circuit found that, in cases concerning the government’s use of third-party messages, Johanns “distilled” the SCV factors into
two inquiries: “(1) the government’s establishment of the message, and (2) its effective control
over the content and dissemination of the message.” 531 F.3d at 281 (citing Johanns, 544 U.S. at
560–62); see infra Part II.C.4.
42. The State cited Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, Virginia, 534 F.3d 352 (4th
Cir. 2008), and Musgrave as cases in which the Fourth Circuit returned to application of the SCV
four-factor test after Page. Conti II, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 373; see infra Part II.C.4 (discussing these
cases).
43. Conti II, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 373.
44. Id.
45. Id. In Page, the school district expressed its opposition to pending voucher legislation
through its website and through e-mails and letters to parents and school employees. 531 F.3d at
278–79. A county resident sued the school district after it refused to allow him to express his support for the pending legislation using the district’s website and other communication channels. Id.
at 279; see infra Part II.C.4.
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After applying the SCV factors, the district court concluded that the
Choose Life plates were not pure government speech, but instead were “a
government-sponsored avenue to encourage private speech.” 46 The court
held that offering the Choose Life plate while rejecting a pro-choice plate
constituted viewpoint discrimination by the State in violation of the First
Amendment. 47 North Carolina appealed the district court’s decision to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 48
II LEGAL BACKGROUND
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” 49 This
guarantee creates a presumption of unconstitutionality when the government regulates or restricts individual expression based on content. 50 Unless
the restricted speech falls within one of the established exceptions to freedom of speech, the restriction will be struck down as violative of the First
Amendment. 51
The Free Speech Clause also limits the government’s ability to regulate speech that occurs on government property. Such regulations are reviewed according to the property’s classification as a traditional public forum, designated public forum, or limited public forum. 52 In a traditional
public forum or a designated public forum, government restrictions on private speech must satisfy strict scrutiny review, meaning “the restriction
must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.”53 In
such fora, reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions are permissible,
but restrictions based on viewpoint are prohibited.54 In a limited public forum, the government may restrict private speech by subject matter, or limit

46. Conti II, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 375.
47. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 799 (4th Cir. 2004);
Rose, 361 F.3d at 800 (Luttig, J., concurring in the judgment); Rose, 361 F.3d at 801 (Gregory, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
48. ACLU of N.C. v. Tata, 742 F.3d 563, 567 (4th Cir. 2014.)
49. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
50. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (“[M]ost situations where the State has a
justifiable interest in regulating speech will fall within one or more of the various established exceptions . . . to the usual rule that governmental bodies may not prescribe the form or content of
individual expression.”).
51. Id. Examples of established exceptions to the prohibition of government regulation on
speech include obscenity, “fighting words,” and “true threats.” Id. at 20 (discussing obscenity and
fighting words); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003) (discussing true threats).
52. See Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469–70 (2009) (noting the various standards of review and permissible restrictions on speech for each type of forum).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 469.
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its use to certain groups. 55 However, such restrictions must be reasonable
and viewpoint neutral. 56
A. The Supreme Court Implicitly Employed a Government Speech
Analysis for the First Time in Rust, Then Developed the Doctrine in
Subsequent Cases Interpreting Rust
The government speech doctrine stands for the proposition that when
the government speaks for itself, “it is entitled to say what it wishes.”57
Thus, before a court can evaluate the constitutionality of a regulation or restriction on speech, it first must determine which entity is speaking—the
government or a private party. This doctrine has its origins in Rust v. Sullivan, 58 where the Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to
federal funds conditioned upon certain restrictions on speech.59 Although
the Rust Court never used the term “government speech,” subsequent First
Amendment cases cited Rust as an example of the government speaking for
itself to contrast cases in which the government funded private speech, thus
establishing the government speech doctrine.60
1. Rust Established That Traditional First Amendment Analysis
Does Not Apply When the Government Promotes Its Own
Message
Rust concerned Title X of the Public Health Service Act,61 which provides federal funding for family-planning services. 62 The Act expressly
forbids any funds appropriated under Title X being “‘used in programs
where abortion is a method of family planning,’” and provides that all
grants and contracts made under Title X must be in accordance with regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“Secretary”). 63 “In 1988, the Secretary promulgated new regulations designed to
provide . . . ‘guidance to [Title X] grantees about how to preserve the distinction between Title X programs and abortion as a method of family planning.’” 64 The regulations attached three conditions on the grant of federal
funds for Title X projects: (1) the prohibition of counseling or referrals for

55. Id. at 470.
56. Id.
57. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
58. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
59. See id. at 192 (“There is no question but that the statutory prohibition [on speech] contained in § 1008 is constitutional.”).
60. See infra Part II.A.2.
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 300a-6 (2012).
62. 500 U.S. at 178.
63. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a-4(a), 300a-6).
64. Id. at 179 (quoting 53 Fed. Reg. 2923–24 (1988)).
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abortions; (2) the prohibition of encouraging, promoting, or advocating
abortion; and (3) a requirement that the projects be “physically and financially separate” from abortion activities. 65
Title X grantees and doctors who supervised the funds (“Petitioners”)
sued the Secretary on behalf of themselves and their patients, claiming that
the regulations were facially invalid, in part because they violated the First
Amendment rights of Title X clients and health providers.66 Petitioners
claimed that the regulations impermissibly discriminated based on viewpoint by compelling clinics to promote continuing a pregnancy to term
while prohibiting any discussion of abortion as an option.67 The Court rejected Petitioners’ First Amendment argument and found that, rather than
discriminating based on viewpoint, the government had “merely chosen to
fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.” 68 The Court found this
permissible because “[t]he government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to
be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative
program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.” 69 Thus, the
Government can “make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion,
and . . . implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.” 70
2. Subsequent First Amendment Cases Cited Rust as an Example
of the Government Speaking on Its Own Behalf
Although the Rust Court never used the term “government speech,”
subsequent cases involving First Amendment challenges interpreted Rust as
establishing a distinct analysis when the government promotes its own message, as opposed to funding private speech.71 First, in Rosenberger, the
Court cited Rust as it distinguished the government’s use of private speakers to convey its own message (such as in Rust) from government programs
that encourage private speech (such as in Rosenberger). 72 The Court found
that “[w]hen the government disburses public funds to private entities to
convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate

65. Id. at 179–80 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.8–.10 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. Id. at 181.
67. Id. at 192 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 11, Rust, 500 U.S. 173 (No. 89-1391)).
68. Id. at 193.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 192–93 (alteration in original) (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
71. See SCV, 288 F.3d 610, 617 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[N]owhere in Rust did the Court rely explicitly on the government speech rationale. . . . In later cases, however, the Court consistently
has interpreted Rust as indicating that the doctors’ funded counseling activities were government
speech, and that where the government is the speaker, it may choose and tailor its message.”
(footnote omitted) (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001))).
72. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
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steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.” 73 However, the Court held that the same logic does not apply “when
the [government] does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message
it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from
private speakers.” 74 In the latter instance, the government creates a public
forum and viewpoint-based restrictions on speech are impermissible.75
The Court next cited Rust as an example of the government speaking
for itself in Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v.
Southworth. 76 In this case, the Court noted that the First Amendment analysis it employed does not apply when the government speaks on its own
behalf. 77 The Southworth Court also explained the rationale behind the
government speech doctrine, clarifying why traditional First Amendment
principles are inapplicable to instances where the government speaks for itself: “When the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If the citizenry objects,
newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary position.” 78
Finally, in Velazquez, the Court cited Rust as the origin of the government speech doctrine and noted its interpretation as such in Rosenberger
and Southworth. 79 The Court then explained that the government may discriminate based on viewpoint when “the government is itself the speaker”
or when the government funds private speakers to transmit a governmental
message. 80
This line of cases establishes that traditional First Amendment principles, including the prohibition on viewpoint-based discrimination on
speech, do not apply to government speech. 81 However, these preliminary
government speech cases failed to provide a rule for determining what con-

73. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 196–200).
74. Id. at 834.
75. Id.
76. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
77. Id. at 234–35 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. 173; Regan v. Taxation With Representation of
Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983)).
78. Id. at 235.
79. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“The Court in Rust did
not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title
X amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we
have explained Rust on this understanding.”).
80. Id. (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833) (citing Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229, 235).
81. See Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) (“The Free Speech
Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government
speech.”).
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stitutes government speech and left the lower courts with little guidance on
how to analyze this issue. 82
B. Specialty License Plates Contain Elements of both Government and
Private Speech
The Supreme Court first addressed the private speech rights implicated
by license plates in Wooley v. Maynard. 83 Although Wooley dealt with the
private speech interests of standard-issue license plates, lower courts have
since relied on Wooley to support their findings that specialty license plates
also implicate private speech interests.84 The Fourth Circuit was the first
circuit court to address the First Amendment implications of specialty license plates in SCV, where it adopted a four-factor test to determine whether specialty license plates constitute government speech. 85
1.

Wooley Laid the Foundation for Specialty License Plate
Jurisprudence

At issue in Wooley was a New Hampshire state law that required noncommercial vehicles to display license plates with the state motto, “Live
Free or Die,” and another state law that made it a misdemeanor to obscure
the motto. 86 George Maynard and his wife covered the motto on their family vehicles, finding it repugnant to their moral, religious, and political beliefs. 87 Maynard was convicted in state court of violating the misdemeanor
statute and sentenced to pay two fines of twenty-five and fifty dollars, respectively. 88 The Maynards then brought suit in federal district court under
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against New Hampshire officials, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against enforcement of the state statutes.89
The Supreme Court found that “the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to
82. See SCV, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002) (“No clear standard has yet been enunciated
in our circuit or by the Supreme Court for determining when the government is ‘speaking’ and
thus able to draw viewpoint-based distinctions, and when it is regulating private speech and thus
unable to do so.”).
83. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
84. See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 967 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting the
Supreme Court’s indication “that messages conveyed through license plates ‘implicate private
speech interests’” (quoting SCV, 288 F.3d at 621) (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717)); Planned
Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Supreme Court has
held that even messages on standard license plates are associated at least partly with the vehicle
owners.” (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717)).
85. See infra Part II.B.3.
86. 430 U.S. at 707 (quoting N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263:1 (Supp. 1975); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 262:27-c (Supp. 1975)).
87. Id. at 707–08.
88. Id. at 708. Upon refusing to pay the fines, Maynard served fifteen days in jail. Id.
89. Id. at 709.
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speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”90 Thus, the Court
held that the Maynards’ interests implicated First Amendment protections
because the New Hampshire statutes forced them to use their vehicles as
“an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of
view [they found] unacceptable.” 91 Furthermore, the Court found that the
State’s interests of proper identification of passenger vehicles and promoting appreciation of history, individualism, and state pride were not sufficiently compelling to justify requiring the Maynards to display the state
motto on their license plates. 92 Therefore, the Court held that New Hampshire could not require the Maynards to display the state motto on their personal vehicles. 93
2.

Specialty License Plates Allow Individuals to Display a
Particular Message or Image for an Additional Fee

Although Wooley dealt with the private speech interests of standardissue license plates, lower courts have since cited Wooley for the proposition that messages on license plates are associated with the private vehicle
owner’s expression, and that association is only stronger in the case of specialty license plates.94 Specialty license plates are produced by the government, usually at the request of a private individual or organization, to
display a particular message or image. 95 Registered vehicle owners can obtain a specialty license plate by paying additional fees beyond those required for registration. 96
The process of creating specialty license plates varies from state to
state, but there are three models into which the methods of most states can
be classified: the administrative model, the legislative model, and the hybrid model. 97 Under the administrative model, the state has a general specialty license plate statute that establishes the procedure by which organiza-

90. Id. at 714.
91. Id. at 715.
92. Id. at 716–17.
93. Id. at 717.
94. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794 (4th Cir. 2004)
(“[T]he Supreme Court has held that even messages on standard license plates are associated at
least partly with the vehicle owners. This association is much stronger when the vehicle owner
displays a specialty license plate.” (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717; SCV, 288 F.3d 610, 621 (4th
Cir. 2002))).
95. See id. (“Although a specialty license plate, like a standard plate, is state-owned and
bears a state-authorized message, the specialty plate gives private individuals the option to identify with, purchase, and display one of the authorized messages.”).
96. See Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 964 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In specialty license plate cases, private individuals choose to pay the price for obtaining a particular specialty
license plate.”).
97. Stephanie S. Bell, Note, The First Amendment and Specialty License Plates: The
“Choose Life” Controversy, 73 MO. L. REV. 1279, 1281 (2008).
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tions can request specialty plates and designates a state agency (such as the
DMV) to review and process those requests. 98 Under the legislative model,
state legislatures enact statutes that directly authorize the issuance of particular specialty plates, and describe the method by which each plate will be
produced. 99 Finally, under the hybrid model, state legislatures can authorize the issuance of particular specialty plates by statute (as in the legislative
model), or organizations can apply for a specialty plate through a designated state agency (as in the administrative model). 100
3. The Fourth Circuit Adopted a Four-Factor Test to Determine
Whether Specialty License Plates Constitute Government
Speech
The Fourth Circuit was the first circuit court to address the First
Amendment implications of specialty license plates. In SCV, the Virginia
General Assembly enacted a statute authorizing the issuance of specialty
license plates to members of the Sons of Confederate Veterans organization
(“SCV”). 101 However, unlike other Virginia statutes authorizing specialty
plates for members of various organizations, this statute included a logo restriction that prohibited SCV from incorporating its logo, which features the
Confederate flag, on its plates.102 SCV sued the Commissioner of the Virginia DMV, seeking a declaration that the logo restriction was invalid under
the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments and an injunction requiring the
Commissioner to issue SCV’s specialty license plates, logo included, to
members who request them. 103
The Fourth Circuit began by explaining the Supreme Court’s government speech jurisprudence 104 and noted that the authority of the government
to speak on its own behalf “necessarily carries with it the authority to select
from among various viewpoints those that the government will express as
its own.” 105 The court also commented on the Supreme Court’s explanation
in Southworth of the rationale behind the government speech doctrine, noting that “where the government itself is responsible, and therefore accountable, for the message that its speech sends, the danger ordinarily involved in
governmental viewpoint-based choices is not present.” 106

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id. at 1282.
Id. at 1283.
288 F.3d 610, 613 (4th Cir. 2002).
Id.
Id. at 614.
See supra Part II.A.
SCV, 288 F.3d at 617.
Id. at 618; see supra text accompanying notes 76–78.
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Next, the Fourth Circuit noted that neither it nor the Supreme Court
had enunciated a “clear standard” for distinguishing government speech
from private speech. 107 Thus, the court identified four factors examined by
other circuits who had addressed the question in other contexts:
(1) the central “purpose” of the program in which the speech in
question occurs; (2) the degree of “editorial control” exercised by
the government or private entities over the content of the speech;
(3) the identity of the “literal speaker”; and (4) whether the government or the private entity bears the “ultimate responsibility”
for the content of the speech. 108
The court noted that these factors do not “constitute an exhaustive or always-applicable list,” but found them “instructive” and sufficient to resolve
the issue in this case. 109
Applying these factors to SCV’s specialty license plate, the court
found, first, that the purpose of Virginia’s specialty license plate program
was primarily to produce revenue for the Commonwealth, while also allowing for the private expression of a variety of messages. 110 Therefore, the
first factor weighed against a finding of government speech.111 Second, the
court concluded that Virginia exercised “little, if any, control” over the content of its specialty plates, finding instead that the sponsors of the specialty
plates “make the substantive decisions regarding . . . content.” 112 Third, the
court found that the literal speaker and ultimate responsibility factors also
weighed in favor of private speech because the plates, although owned by
Virginia, are mounted on vehicles owned by private persons. 113 Citing
Wooley, the court found that “license plates, even when owned by the government, implicate private speech interests because of the connection of any
message on the plate to the driver or owner of the vehicle.” 114 Therefore,
the court concluded that the specialty license plate authorized by the statute

107. SCV, 288 F.3d at 618.
108. Id. (citing Wells v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 2001) (using
the four factors to determine whether a sign naming the private sponsors of a public holiday display constituted government speech); Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of
Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000) (using the four factors to determine whether messages from
private sponsors on a public radio station constituted government speech); Downs v. L.A. Unified
Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying similar analysis to determine whether
postings on school bulletin boards constitute government speech)).
109. Id. at 619.
110. Id.
111. See id. (“[T]he net financial impact of the program on the Commonwealth’s fisc does
indicate that the General Assembly here is not making the kind of selective funding decisions involved in cases like Rust . . . .”).
112. Id. at 621.
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977)).

2015]

ACLU OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TATA

123

was SCV’s speech, not Virginia’s, and thus First Amendment protections
applied. 115
4. The Fourth Circuit Applied Its Four-Factor Test to an Earlier
Challenge to Choose Life License Plates
The Fourth Circuit subsequently applied the SCV four-factor test for
distinguishing government speech to specialty license plates in Rose. The
facts of Rose closely resemble those of Conti: The South Carolina legislature enacted a statute (“South Carolina Act”) that authorized the issuance of
a Choose Life plate that would be available to any interested vehicle owner
in South Carolina. 116 Planned Parenthood of South Carolina (“PPSC”) attempted to amend earlier versions of the South Carolina Act to include a
provision for the issuance of a pro-choice plate, but those bills died in
committee.117
PPSC sued South Carolina officials seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief, alleging that the South Carolina Act violated the First Amendment by
regulating access to the specialty license plate forum on the basis of viewpoint. 118 The Fourth Circuit found that the district court incorrectly interpreted SCV—by overlooking important factual differences between the two
cases—as holding that specialty license plates necessarily constitute private
rather than government speech. 119 In SCV, the Fourth Circuit noted, “Virginia acted as regulator of the existing specialty license plate forum”; in
comparison, in this case South Carolina was acting “as a covert speaker”
within that forum. 120
Proper application of the SCV four-factor test led the court to conclude
that the Choose Life plate contained elements of both private and government speech. 121 First, the court found that the purpose of the South Carolina Act was “to promote [South Carolina’s] preference for the pro-life position,” and thus this factor weighed in favor of finding government
115. Id. at 621–22. The court went on to find that Virginia’s logo restriction was impermissible viewpoint discrimination, as the Commissioner failed to demonstrate that the restriction was
the least restrictive means available to serve a compelling government interest. Id. at 626.
116. Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 788 (4th Cir. 2004). According
to the court, the South Carolina Act “came about because of the perseverance of two legislators
who were acting on their own initiative”; it was not initiated by any pro-life organization. Id. at
789.
117. Id. at 788. South Carolina, operating under the hybrid model of specialty-license-plate
creation, also has a general statute that authorizes the issuance of specialty license plates for nonprofit organizations. Id. However, organizational plates are only available to certified members
of the organization and may only contain the organization’s emblem. Id. (quoting S.C. CODE
ANN. § 56-3-8000(A), (H) (2001)). PPSC did not apply for an organizational plate. Id.
118. Id. at 789.
119. Id. at 793.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 794.
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speech. 122 Second, the court found that South Carolina “exercises complete
editorial control over the content of the speech on the Choose Life plate,”
and thus this factor also weighed in favor of finding government speech. 123
Third, to determine the identity of the literal speaker and who bears the ultimate responsibility for the speech, the court, citing Wooley, “found that
even messages on standard license plates are associated at least partly with
the vehicle owners. This association is much stronger when the vehicle
owner displays a specialty license plate.” 124 Furthermore, the court found
that those who viewed the Choose Life plate would assume that the vehicle
owner “holds a pro-life viewpoint.” 125 Therefore, the court concluded that
the vehicle owner was the literal speaker of, and bore the ultimate responsibility for, the Choose Life plate, and thus these two factors weighed in favor
of finding private speech. 126
Since the four factors led to an “indeterminate result,” with two factors
weighing in favor of government speech and two weighing in favor of private speech, the court concluded that the Choose Life plate was mixed
speech, 127 and thus the government speech doctrine did not apply. 128 Therefore, the South Carolina Act, by authorizing the Choose Life plate while rejecting a pro-choice plate, constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment and thus was invalid. 129
C. The Supreme Court Used a Different Analysis for Government
Speech in Johanns, Producing Disagreement Among the Circuits
over the Proper Test
After the Fourth Circuit had developed the SCV four-factor test for
evaluating government speech, the Supreme Court addressed the issue using a different analysis in Johanns. 130 The Johanns decision produced disagreement among the circuits over the proper test for determining government speech. 131

122. Id. at 793.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 794 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977); SCV, 288 F.3d 610, 621
(4th Cir. 2002)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 793.
128. See supra note 31 (discussing mixed speech).
129. Rose, 361 F.3d at 799–800.
130. See infra Part II.C.1.
131. See infra Parts II.C.2–4.
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1. The Supreme Court Evaluated the Government’s Establishment
and Control of the Contested Speech in Johanns
In Johanns, beef producers objected to the Department of Agriculture’s requirement that they fund a beef promotion campaign because it undermined their efforts to promote their own specialty beef products, such as
American beef, grain-fed beef, and certified Angus beef. 132 In determining
that the beef ads at issue constituted government speech, the Court focused
on the government’s establishment and control of the content of the message, without explicitly stating that this was the test for government
speech. 133
Regarding establishment, the Court noted that “[t]he message set out
in the beef promotions is from beginning to end the message established by
the Federal Government,” and that the government had “set out the overarching message and some of its elements.” 134 Regarding control, the Court
found that the federal government “effectively controlled” the message of
the beef promotions and “the Secretary exercise[d] final approval authority
over every word used in every promotional campaign.” 135 Thus, the Court
concluded that “[w]hen, as here, the government sets the overall message to
be communicated and approves every word that is disseminated,” the government speech doctrine applies.136
2. The Sixth Circuit Applied Johanns to the Specialty License Plate
Context
The Sixth Circuit, in ACLU of Tennessee v. Bredesen, 137 held that Johanns created the establishment and control test for determining government speech, so that the government speech doctrine applies “when the
government determines an overarching message and retains power to ap-

132. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 555–56 (2005).
133. Id. at 560–62.
134. Id. at 560–61.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 562. The Johanns Court declined to address the beef producers’ argument that the
beef ads could not be government speech because they are attributed to someone other than the
government. Id. at 564. Many of the ads bore the attribution, “Funded by America’s Beef Producers.” Id. at 555. However, the Court found that this argument “relate[d] to compelled speech
rather than compelled subsidy, and therefore was inapplicable to this compelled subsidy case. Id.
at 564–65. Compelled subsidy refers to when a private party is required by the government to
fund someone else’s message; compelled speech refers to when a private party “is obliged personally to express a message he disagrees with, imposed by the government.” Id. at 557. The Court
found that the attribution argument might present a valid objection only if “‘those singled out to
pay the tax are closely linked with the expression’ in a way that makes them appear to endorse the
government message,” which it did not find to be the case here. Id. at 565 n.8 (quoting id. at 575–
76 (Souter, J., dissenting)).
137. 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006).
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prove every word disseminated at its behest.” 138 In Bredesen, the ACLU of
Tennessee challenged the constitutionality of a Tennessee statute authorizing the issuance of a Choose Life plate without a corresponding pro-choice
plate. 139 Applying Johanns’s establishment and control test, the Sixth Circuit, contrary to the conclusion reached by the Fourth Circuit in Rose, 140
found that the Choose Life plate constituted government speech.141
The Sixth Circuit found that Tennessee established the message on the
Choose Life plate by specifying in the authorizing statute that the plates
would display the words “Choose Life.” 142 Furthermore, the court found
that Tennessee exercised “final approval authority” over the Choose Life
plate by retaining a veto over its design and through its power to withdraw
the authorization. 143 Therefore, the court concluded that, just like the federal government in Johanns, “[t]he Tennessee legislature chose the ‘Choose
Life’ plate’s overarching message and approved every word to be disseminated.” 144 Thus, Tennessee did not violate the First Amendment by authorizing the Choose Life plate without a corresponding pro-choice plate.145
Judge Martin dissented in Bredesen, concluding that the majority erred
by applying a compelled subsidy analysis “to a case where . . . nothing is
compelled.” 146 He explained that Johanns involved compelled subsidies to
support the government’s message, which is immune from First Amendment challenges, as opposed to compelled subsidies to support a private entity’s message, which is unconstitutional.147 He noted that the potential
harm in a compelled subsidy challenge “is being forced to give the government money to pay for someone else’s message.” 148 However, this harm is
alleviated when the message is that of the government because “the government must be able to tax and spend in order to function.” 149 Therefore,
courts must determine whether the contested speech in compelled subsidy
cases is that of the government or a private party in order to decide whether
the compulsion is constitutional.150
Judge Martin found that “[t]he First Amendment harm in this case . . .
has nothing to do with being forced to speak or to subsidize a message. Ra138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 375.
Id. at 371–72.
See supra Part II.B.4.
Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 376.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 381 (Martin, J., dissenting).
Id. at 385.
Id.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 385.
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ther, the harm is being denied the opportunity to speak on the same terms as
other private citizens within a government sponsored forum.” 151 Therefore,
he concluded that the Tennessee statute authorizing the Choose Life plate
without a corresponding pro-choice plate constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment.152
3. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits Distinguished Johanns from the
Specialty License Plate Analysis
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits, in two cases challenging the constitutionality of the respective state legislatures’ refusal to issue a Choose Life
plate, both distinguished Johanns and limited the establishment and control
test to compelled subsidy cases. In Stanton, the Ninth Circuit applied the
SCV four-factor test 153 and held that the Choose Life plates constituted private speech. 154 Thus, the Arizona License Plate Commission, by denying
the Arizona Life Coalition’s application for a specialty license plate, had
engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First
Amendment. 155
The Seventh Circuit, facing very similar facts in Choose Life Illinois,
Inc. v. White, 156 distilled the SCV four-factor test into a single inquiry: “Under all the circumstances, would a reasonable person consider the speaker to
be the government or a private party?” 157 The court noted that “the degree
to which the message originates with the government, the degree to which
the government exercises editorial control over the message, and whether
the government or a private party communicates the message” were among
the factors to be considered in its analysis.158 Applying this simplified version of the SCV test, the court found that the vehicle owners who display
the specialty plates and the organizations whose logos or messages are depicted on them are the “most obvious speakers in the specialty-plate context” and that “the driver is the ultimate communicator of the message.” 159
Therefore, the court concluded that the messages displayed on specialty license plates are not government speech. 160 However, unlike the Ninth Cir151. Id. at 386.
152. Id. at 390. Judge Martin further distinguished Johanns from “true compelled speech cases,” where compulsion is unconstitutional regardless of whether the message is that of the government or a private party. Id. at 385 (quoting Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550,
557 (2005)).
153. Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 2008).
154. Id. at 968.
155. Id. at 973.
156. 547 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2008).
157. Id. at 863.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 863–64.
160. Id. at 863.
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cuit in Stanton, the court found that the Illinois General Assembly’s rejection of a Choose Life plate was viewpoint neutral and thus permissible because the state had excluded the subject of abortion from the specialty license plate forum altogether. 161
4. The Fourth Circuit Inconsistently Applied both Johanns and the
SCV Four-Factor Test in Government Speech Cases Outside of
the Specialty License Plate Context
After Johanns, the Fourth Circuit, in a number of government speech
cases outside of the specialty-license-plate context, vacillated between application of Johanns’s establishment and control test and the SCV fourfactor test. For example, in Page, a county resident brought a Section 1983
First Amendment action against a school district after being denied access
to the school district’s website and other communication channels (such as
letters distributed to students and e-mails sent to school district employees)
to express his support for pending state legislation, which the school district
opposed. 162
In determining whether the school district’s opposition to the bill constituted government speech, the Fourth Circuit noted that Johanns distilled
the SCV factors, “particularly in cases involving the government’s use of
third-party messages, [into] (1) the government’s establishment of the message, and (2) its effective control over the content and dissemination of the
message.” 163 Applying these factors to the school district’s opposition to
the pending state legislation, the court found that the school district “established its message to oppose” the bill.164 Furthermore, the school district
“adopted and approved all speech, even that of third parties, as representative of its own position” and thus controlled the content of the message. 165
The school district also “controlled [the message’s] dissemination to the
public” by distributing it through its own website, e-mails sent to employees, and letters sent home to students. 166 Therefore, the court concluded
that the school district’s opposition to the bill constituted government
speech, and thus the school district “did not create a limited public forum to
which [the county resident] was entitled access.” 167 As such, the school
district did not violate the First Amendment by denying him access to its
communication channels.168
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 866.
531 F.3d 275, 277–79 (4th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 281 (citing Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–62 (2005)).
Id. at 282.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 288.
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Just one month after its decision in Page, the Fourth Circuit addressed
the government speech doctrine again in Turner, where the court returned to
its application of the SCV four-factor test to determine that legislative prayers at a city council meeting constitute government speech.169 Apparently
contradicting the Page court’s “distillation” of the SCV factors into the Johanns establishment and control factors, the court in Turner affirmatively
stated, “The Fourth Circuit has adopted a four-factor test for determining
when speech can be attributed to the government.” 170 The court did not
mention, much less attempt to distinguish, either Johanns or Page.
The Fourth Circuit continued its inconsistent treatment of the government speech doctrine in Musgrave, where the court found that retailers’ advertisements for their video lottery machines constituted hybrid speech. 171
The court in Musgrave found that “the state [was] conveying a message for
which it is politically accountable,” and that these two factors (a government-conveyed message and political accountability) weighed in favor of
government speech. 172 The court cited Johanns in finding that the message
conveyed by the government was one of moderation, but did not mention
either the establishment or control factors.173 However, the court also noted
that the speech was privately funded and that the retailers were the literal
speakers of the advertisements. 174 Citing SCV, the court found that these
two factors weighed in favor of private speech. 175 Thus, the court in Musgrave cited to both Johanns and SCV, but did not explicitly rely on either
test in reaching its ultimate conclusion. Instead, the court apparently examined the factors it found most relevant to the specific facts of this case,
without employing any particular test for determining government speech.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit’s varying analyses in Page, Turner, and Musgrave
demonstrate its unprincipled approach to the government speech doctrine
following Johanns.
D. The Supreme Court Employed a Literal Speaker Analysis in
Summum, but Failed to Guide Lower Courts on the Proper Test for
Distinguishing Government Speech
With the circuits in disagreement about the proper test for determining
government speech and the applicability of Johanns outside of the compelled subsidy context, the Supreme Court addressed the government

169. 534 F.3d 352, 354 (4th Cir. 2008).
170. Id.
171. 553 F.3d 292, 298 (4th Cir. 2009).
172. Id. at 299.
173. Id. at 298 (citing Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 561 n.5 (2005)).
174. Id. at 299.
175. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 792–93 (4th Cir.
2004); SCV, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002)).
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speech doctrine again in Summum. 176 After Summum, lower courts once
again were left to decipher the relevant factors for determining government
speech, the respective weight of each of those factors, and their applicability to various factual circumstances.177
1.

The Supreme Court Revived the Literal Speaker Factor for
Government Speech Analysis in Summum

Summum concerned a city-owned park in Pleasant Grove City, Utah
(“City”), that displayed fifteen permanent monuments, eleven of which
were donated by private parties. 178 One of the donated monuments displayed the Ten Commandments. 179 Summum, a religious organization,
wished to donate a monument to the park that would display the Seven
Aphorisms of Summum, but the City denied the organization’s requests. 180
Summum sued the City, seeking an injunction directing the City to erect its
monument in the park. 181 Summum contended that the City violated the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by accepting the Ten Commandments monument but refusing the Summum monument. 182
The Court unanimously agreed that the monuments in the park, including those that were privately donated, were government speech and thus not
subject to the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 183 However, the
Court declined the opportunity to resolve the confusion over the proper test
for determining when the government speaks on its own behalf. While the
Court did rely on Johanns in finding that “the City [had] ‘effectively controlled’ the messages sent by the monuments in the Park by exercising ‘final approval authority’ over their selection,” 184 the Court did not state that
establishment and control were the dispositive factors in determining government speech. In fact, the Court deemphasized the importance of the
government’s establishment of the message, a crucial factor in Johanns, by
acknowledging that “many of the monuments were not designed or built by
the City and were donated in completed form by private entities.”185
The Court also implicitly appealed to the literal speaker factor of the
SCV test, without citing any cases that had previously analyzed this factor
and without explicitly stating that this factor weighs into the government

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See infra Part II.D.1.
See infra Part II.D.2.
555 U.S. 460, 464–65 (2009).
Id. at 465.
Id.
Id. at 466.
Id.
Id. at 472, 481.
Id. at 473 (quoting Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–61 (2005)).
Id. at 472.
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speech analysis. The Court noted that property owners do not typically allow “the installation of permanent monuments [on their land] that convey a
message with which they do not wish to be associated.” 186 Thus, the Court
found that “persons who observe donated monuments routinely—and reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on the property owner’s behalf.” 187 Therefore, the Court concluded that in the case of the donated monuments in the city-owned park, “there is little chance that
observers will fail to appreciate the identity of the speaker.”188
2. The Eighth Circuit Also Employed a Literal Speaker Analysis,
but Distinguished Summum
Before Tata, only one circuit court had addressed government speech
in the context of specialty license plates since the Summum decision. In
Roach v. Stouffer, 189 a pro-life organization challenged Missouri’s denial of
its application for a specialty license plate.190 The Eighth Circuit, in a case
of first impression in the circuit,191 discussed the approaches of its sister
circuits when addressing specialty license plates,192 and ultimately adopted
the simplified literal speaker test announced by the Seventh Circuit in
White: “Our analysis boils down to one key question: whether, under all the
circumstances, a reasonable and fully informed observer would consider the
speaker to be the government or a private party.” 193 Employing this analysis, the court concluded “that a reasonable and fully informed observer
would consider the speaker to be the organization that sponsors and the vehicle owner who displays the specialty license plate.” 194 Therefore, specialty license plates constitute private speech, and the state’s denial of the
Choose Life plate constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination. 195
The Roach decision, issued just one month after Summum, distinguished that case in a footnote, stating that Summum did not require a finding of government speech in the present case. 196 The court noted that Summum dealt with privately donated monuments in a city-owned park,
whereas specialty license plates are displayed on privately owned vehicles

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 471.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
560 F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 861.
Id. at 864.
Id. at 865–67.
Id. at 867.
Id.
Id. at 868, 870.
Id. at 868 n.3.
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and “facilitate expressive conduct on the part of the organization and its
supporters, not the government.” 197
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
On February 11, 2014, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision in Conti II 198 and explicitly agreed with its conclusion that the
Choose Life plate implicated private speech interests sufficient “to preclude
a finding of purely government speech.” 199 On appeal, North Carolina did
not deny the Plaintiffs’ contention that its approval of the Choose Life plate
and concurrent rejection of a pro-choice plate constituted viewpoint discrimination. 200 Instead, the State argued “that it was free to discriminate
based on viewpoint because the license plate speech at issue was solely its
own”—in other words, because the specialty plate constituted pure government speech to which First Amendment restrictions do not apply. 201 The
Fourth Circuit disagreed however, and concluded without hesitation that the
Choose Life plate contained elements of private speech and therefore did
not qualify as government speech. 202
North Carolina argued, as it had below, that the Fourth Circuit had
“abandoned the SCV factors” for identifying government speech with its
decision in Page. 203 The court rejected this argument for three reasons: 1)
because Page is not a Supreme Court or en banc decision, it could not overrule prior Fourth Circuit precedent; 204 2) “Page does not suggest any attempt to overthrow the SCV factors in favor of a single-factor control
test”; 205 and 3) Fourth Circuit decisions after Page explicitly analyzed the
SCV factors in determining government speech. 206 North Carolina also reiterated its argument that Johanns and Summum “implicitly overruled” the
SCV test and asserted that those cases confirm the government’s control
197. Id.
198. ACLU of N.C. v. Tata, 742 F.3d 563, 576 (4th Cir. 2014). By the time the case reached
the Fourth Circuit, Anthony Tata had replaced Conti as Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Transportation, and James Forte had replaced Robertson as Commissioner of the North
Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles. See id. at 563 (naming “Anthony J. Tata, in his official
capacity as Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Transportation; [and] James L. Forte,
in his official capacity as Commissioner of the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles” as
defendants).
199. Id. at 574 (quoting Conti II, 912 F. Supp. 2d 363, 375 (E.D.N.C. 2012), aff’d sub nom.
Tata, 742 F.3d 563)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
200. Id. at 567.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 575.
203. Id. at 569.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. (citing Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, Va., 534 F.3d 352, 354 (4th Cir.
2008)).
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over the speech as the dispositive factor and eliminate any reliance on the
literal speaker factor.207 The Fourth Circuit disagreed and stated, “We cannot square the Supreme Court’s multi-faceted, context-specific reasoning in
Summum with North Carolina’s blanket contention that all that matters is
who controls the message.” 208
After concluding that the SCV factors “remain appropriate tools for
evaluating whether speech is government, private, or both,” the Fourth Circuit applied those factors to the Choose Life plate.209 The court found that
three factors—the central purpose of the program in which the speech in
question occurs, the identity of the literal speaker, and which party bears the
ultimate responsibility for the speech—weighed in favor of private
speech. 210 The remaining factor—the degree of editorial control exercised
by the government over the content—weighed in favor of government
speech. 211
First, the court determined “that the purpose of the specialty license
plate program, including the ‘Choose Life’ plate, is to allow North Carolina
drivers to express their affinity for various special interests, as well as to
raise revenue for the state.” 212 Furthermore, the court concluded that, with
over 200 specialty plates to choose from covering a range of interests, “[i]t
defies logic, and may in fact create other problems (such as Establishment
Clause issues in the case of the Knights of Columbus [specialty plate offered by the State]) to suggest that all of these plates constitute North Carolina’s—and only North Carolina’s—message.” 213
Second, the court found, as both parties had agreed, that North Carolina exercised complete editorial control over the content of the message. 214
Third, the Fourth Circuit noted that “the Supreme Court [in Wooley]
deemed license plates a sphere of private ‘intellect and spirit’ that ‘implicat[es] First Amendment protections’ from government control” 215 and
concluded that the literal speaker of a message on a specialty license plate
207. Id. at 569–70.
208. Id. at 571. North Carolina cited to a third Supreme Court case “for the proposition that
[u]nder the government speech doctrine, North Carolina can claim the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own
message.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Hurley v. IrishAm. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995)). The Fourth Circuit
found that this case had “absolutely no bearing” on the instant case because “Hurley had nothing
to do with the government speech doctrine” and “[i]f anything, Hurley hurts North Carolina’s
cause.” Id.
209. Id. at 571–72.
210. Id. at 573.
211. Id. at 572–75.
212. Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
213. Id. at 573.
214. Id.
215. Id. (second alteration in original) (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977)).
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that the vehicle owner selected must be the vehicle owner.216 Fourth and
finally, the Fourth Circuit held that the private party bears the ultimate responsibility for the speech’s content because “‘[w]hen a special license
plate is purchased, it is really the private citizen who engages the government to publish his message,’ not the other way around.” 217 The specialty
plate would not exist but for the private party establishing, applying for, and
paying for it, while the government’s role is limited to that of publisher of
the private message. 218
Because North Carolina did not challenge the district court’s conclusion that, upon finding that the specialty license plates implicate private
speech rights, offering a Choose Life plate while refusing to authorize a
pro-choice plate constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment,219 and because that conclusion was supported by Rose, the Fourth Circuit did not disturb that finding. 220 The State did
contend, however, that its inability to filter out certain specialty plates
would “force it to end its specialty plate program.” 221 The court responded
that its ruling “does not render [North] Carolina powerless to regulate its
specialty license plate forum,” 222 as long as it does so “in a viewpointneutral fashion.” 223 The court suggested as an alternative that North Carolina could “choose to avoid the reproductive choice debate altogether,” and
noted that the Seventh Circuit had upheld such a restriction as being viewpoint neutral and thus permissible.224
IV. ANALYSIS
Although the Fourth Circuit in Tata correctly concluded that the
Choose Life plate constituted private, not government, speech, it incorrectly

216. Id. at 574.
217. Id. (quoting Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor
Vehicles, 305 F.3d 241, 246 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en
banc)).
218. Id. (citing Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 305 F.3d at 246 (Luttig, J., respecting the
denial of rehearing en banc)).
219. Id. at 575 (quoting Conti II, 912 F. Supp. 2d 363, 375 (E.D.N.C. 2012), aff’d sub nom.
Tata, 742 F.3d 563)).
220. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 799 (4th Cir. 2004)).
221. Id.
222. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rose, 361 F.3d at 799) (internal quotation marks omitted).
223. Id. The court pointed out that North Carolina already imposes a viewpoint-neutral regulation on its specialty-plate program by requiring 300 applications before issuing a new plate. Id.
224. Id. (citing Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 865–66 (7th Cir. 2008)). In
White, Illinois “excluded the entire subject of abortion from its specialty-plate program.” 547
F.3d at 865. The Seventh Circuit found that the restriction was one on subject matter, not viewpoint, because the state did not favor any particular perspective over another. Id. at 866; see supra
Part II.C.3.
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interpreted the Supreme Court case law on the government speech doctrine,
which resulted in it employing an improper analysis to reach this conclusion. The Fourth Circuit should have distinguished Johanns and limited its
application to compelled subsidy cases. 225 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit
should have interpreted Summum as analyzing the two dispositive factors in
government speech cases that do not involve compulsion. 226
The Fourth Circuit should have simplified and reduced its four-factor
balancing test into a dispositive two-element test: the actual and apparent
accountability test. Under this test, the contested speech is that of the government if (1) the government controls the content and dissemination of the
message, and (2) the government appears, to a reasonable and fully informed observer, to be the literal speaker of the message. The existence of
these two elements ensures that the government can be held accountable for
its speech through the political process and thus the contested speech can
properly be characterized as government speech.227 If either or both of
these elements are lacking, then the contested speech is private speech and
traditional First Amendment protections apply.
A. The Rationale Underlying the Government Speech Doctrine
Supports the Actual and Apparent Accountability Test
The actual and apparent accountability test promotes the underlying rationale behind the government speech doctrine: political accountability.
The Supreme Court explained in Southworth that government speech is exempt from traditional First Amendment protections because the government
can be held accountable to the public through the political process: “If the
citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different
or contrary position.” 228 The Fourth Circuit elaborated on this position by
stating that “where the government itself is responsible, and therefore accountable, for the message that its speech sends, the danger ordinarily involved in governmental viewpoint-based choices is not present.” 229 This
accountability also explains why, when the government speaks for itself, it
can restrict speech on the basis of viewpoint “to ensure that its message is
neither garbled nor distorted” 230—because if the government is to be held
accountable for its speech, it is imperative that the public is able to delineate

225. See infra Part IV.D.
226. See infra Part IV.B.
227. See infra Part IV.A.
228. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000); see
supra text accompanying notes 76–78.
229. SCV, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002).
230. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
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its message from that of other speakers. Thus, the linchpin of the government speech doctrine is governmental accountability. 231
The government’s actual ability to control the content and dissemination of its message, and its appearance to the public as the literal speaker,
are both necessary to hold the government accountable for its speech
through the political process. The first element establishes the government’s actual accountability for its speech, while the second element establishes the government’s apparent accountability to the public for its speech.
As the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have observed in their
government speech cases, speech cannot be attributed to the government
unless a reasonable observer would understand that it is the government that
is speaking. 232 This is because the government cannot be held accountable
for its speech through the political process if the citizenry does not recognize that it is the government doing the speaking. 233 Without such recognition, the public would not see the need to elect new officials who “espouse
some different or contrary position” to the one with which they disagree.234
Just as important to the goal of government accountability is the government’s ability to control the content and dissemination of its message.
The importance of this element is made clear in the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johanns and Summum, and the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bredesen, all of which heavily relied on the government’s effective control over
the message in finding that the contested speech in each case was that of the
231. See Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source,
88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 597 (2008) (“Government speech is thus most valuable and least dangerous
when its governmental source is apparent, enabling the public to more accurately assess the message’s credibility and to take accountability measures as appropriate.”); id. at 599–600 (“If, however, political accountability is not available as a check on the government because the governmental source is obscured, then the safeguards of traditional First Amendment analysis should
apply.”).
232. See Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Our analysis boils down to
one key question: whether, under all the circumstances, a reasonable and fully informed observer
would consider the speaker to be the government or a private party.”); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v.
White, 547 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Under all the circumstances, would a reasonable person consider the speaker to be the government or a private party?”). See generally Turner v. City
Council of Fredericksburg, Va., 534 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding government speech where
the government was found to be the literal speaker); Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956
(9th Cir. 2008) (finding private speech where the private party was found to be the literal speaker);
Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004) (same); SCV, 288 F.3d 610
(4th Cir. 2002) (same).
233. See W. Va. Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292,
299 (4th Cir. 2009) (“The fact that the state is conveying a message for which it is politically accountable suggests that the speech at issue is government speech.”); Rose, 361 F.3d at 799 (“As
the citizen becomes less likely to associate specialty plate messages with the State, the State’s accountability for any message is correspondingly diminished.”); Norton, supra note 231, at 603
(“Absent an understanding of the message’s governmental source, onlookers cannot fully evaluate
the message’s credibility, nor will they realize the possibility of holding the government accountable as the source of messages they find objectionable.”).
234. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000).
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government. 235 Just as the government cannot be held accountable for
speech if the public does not know that the government is speaking, the
government also cannot be held accountable for speech when it has no ability to control the content and dissemination of the message that is ultimately
expressed to the public. 236 If such were the case, the newly elected officials, even if they espouse a different viewpoint from their predecessors,
would be unable to alter the government’s message in response to public
concern. Therefore, the government must have the ability to control the
content and dissemination of its message, and thus the ability to respond to
the political process, in order to be held accountable for its speech.
B. Summum Employed an Actual and Apparent Accountability
Analysis to Distinguish Government Speech, Without Making the
Test Explicit
As the most recent Supreme Court decision to address government
speech and the more factually similar case, the Fourth Circuit should have
found the analysis in Summum to be controlling in Tata, and should have
limited the analysis of Johanns to the compelled subsidy context. In Summum, the Court did not state any particular test or required factors for determining what constitutes government speech. However, the Court explicitly relied on the government’s ability to control the content and
dissemination of its message, 237 and referenced the government’s appearance as the literal speaker, 238 in finding that the privately donated monuments on government-owned property constitute government speech. 239
The Court cited Johanns in finding that the City “effectively controlled” the
message expressed through the monuments in that it exercised “final approval authority” over which monuments were selected. 240
Interestingly, the Court in Summum did not mention the other element
that was critical in Johanns—the government’s establishment of the message. Indeed, this element weighed against a finding of government speech
in Summum because the messages of the monuments were established by
the private individuals and organizations who created and donated them, not

235. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 473 (2009); Johanns v. Livestock
Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–62 (2005); ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 376 (6th
Cir. 2006).
236. Cf. Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365, 415 (2009)
(advocating a finding of government speech where the message is “expressed in a medium or format effectively owned and controlled by government and clearly reserved for the purpose of expressing only those messages the government regards as its own”).
237. Summum, 555 U.S. at 473 (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–61).
238. Id. at 471.
239. Id. at 472.
240. Id. at 473 (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–61).
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by the government. 241 The Court’s inattention to this element in Summum
suggests its inapplicability to the government speech determination outside
of the compelled subsidy context.
However, the Court did allude to the government’s appearance to the
public as the literal speaker of the messages displayed on the monuments.242
Although the Court did not cite any of the circuit court decisions that had
explicitly used this factor in the government speech analysis, nor did the
Court state that this factor was necessary or even relevant to its determination, it apparently discussed the literal speaker factor to support its conclusion that privately donated monuments on government-owned property
constitute government speech. 243 Specifically, the Court stated that a reasonable observer would ordinarily expect that a permanent monument on
one’s property reflects the property owner’s viewpoint. 244 Therefore, the
public is aware that it is the government, rather than the private donors, who
is speaking through the monuments in the city park.
Thus, in Tata, the Fourth Circuit should have interpreted Summum as
finding the government’s control over the message and its appearance as the
literal speaker to be the two critical factors in distinguishing government
speech. The importance of the control factor is made clear in the Summum
opinion in that it is the Court’s primary focus in finding in favor of government speech. 245 However, it is doubtful that the Court would have
reached the same conclusion if that finding was not also supported by the
literal speaker factor. Furthermore, the Court’s virtual silence on the establishment factor, and its acknowledgement that this factor actually weighed
against a finding of government speech in that case, should have been interpreted by the Fourth Circuit as dispensing with this element in the government speech analysis, at least in cases not concerning compelled subsidies.
C. The Fourth Circuit Already Emphasizes the Government’s Control
and the Literal Speaker Factors in the SCV Four-Factor Test
When employing the SCV four-factor test to distinguish government
speech, the Fourth Circuit already emphasizes the degree of governmental
control and literal speaker factors more so than it does the other two factors.
Although the court describes the four factors as “instructive” and notes that

241. See id. at 472 (“[M]any of the monuments were not designed or built by the City and
were donated in completed form by private entities . . . .”).
242. Id. at 471.
243. See id. at 470 (“Permanent monuments displayed on public property typically represent
government speech.”).
244. Id. at 471.
245. See id. at 473 (“[T]he City has ‘effectively controlled’ the messages sent by the monuments in the Park by exercising ‘final approval authority’ over their selection.” (quoting Johanns,
544 U.S. at 560–61)).
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no particular factor is dispositive, 246 the Seventh and Eighth Circuits both
found that the SCV test could be simplified into a single factor—that of the
literal speaker. 247 The Fourth Circuit itself consistently analyzes the literal
speaker factor and the ultimate responsibility factor as if they are equivalent, rather than two separate factors.248 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit
has consistently refused to attribute speech to the government when the literal speaker/ultimate responsibility factor weighs against it—even if both of
the other factors weigh in its favor.249 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit appears
to place greater weight on the literal speaker/ultimate responsibility factor
than on the other two factors combined.
However, the Fourth Circuit has not gone as far as the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits in holding that the literal speaker factor is the sole, determinative factor. 250 By retaining its other factors—the purpose of the program
in which the speech occurs and the government’s degree of control over the
speech—the Fourth Circuit has recognized the importance of actual government accountability to a finding of government speech. But these two
factors also can be reduced to a single factor—the government’s ability to
control the content and dissemination of its message. The other SCV factor—the purpose of the program in which the speech occurs—does not add
value to the analysis because it merely informs the other factors in a conclusory manner. For example, when the court finds that the purpose of the
program is to promote individual expression, this necessarily implies that
the literal speaker is the private party. 251 In contrast, when the court finds
that the purpose of the program is to promulgate the state’s message on a
particular subject, this generally supports a finding that the government
controls the content and dissemination of that message. 252 Thus, the pur-

246. See ACLU of N.C. v. Tata, 742 F.3d 563, 569 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting the court’s “express
acknowledgement in [SCV] that the four factors identified there are ‘instructive’ but neither ‘exhaustive’ nor always uniformly applicable” (quoting SCV, 288 F.3d 610, 619 (4th Cir. 2002))).
247. Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547
F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008).
248. See Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 793–94 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Finally, I consider the third and fourth factors of the SCV test: the ‘identity of the literal speaker’ and
‘whether the government or the private entity bears the ultimate responsibility’ for the speech.”);
id. at 794 (“The same reasoning [applied to the literal speaker factor] leads me to conclude (under
the fourth SCV factor) that the private individual bears the ultimate responsibility for the speech
on the Choose Life plate.”); SCV, 288 F.3d at 621 (“We next inquire into who is the ‘literal speaker’ and who bears the ‘ultimate responsibility’ for the speech in this case.”).
249. See W. Va. Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292
(4th Cir. 2009); Rose, 361 F.3d 786.
250. See Tata, 742 F.3d at 571–72 (“Having concluded that the ‘instructive’ factors we identified in SCV remain appropriate tools for evaluating whether speech is government, private, or
both, we turn to applying those factors here.”).
251. See Tata, 742 F.3d at 572, 574; SCV, 288 F.3d at 619, 621.
252. See, e.g., Rose, 361 F.3d at 793 (“Here, the idea for a Choose Life plate originated with
the State, and the legislature determined that the plate will bear the message ‘Choose Life.’ The
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pose factor is merely an approximation for the control and literal speaker
factors, and does not need to be analyzed separately.
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in government speech cases is
generally consistent with the actual and apparent accountability test in that
it emphasizes the importance of the government’s ability to control the
speech as well as the public’s recognition of the government as speaker.
However, the Fourth Circuit could have made its analysis in Tata more
clear and concise by consolidating the literal speaker and ultimate responsibility factors into a single factor—apparent accountability—and eliminating
the conclusory purpose of the program factor.
D. Johanns’s Establishment and Control Test Is Limited to Compelled
Subsidy Cases
The Fourth Circuit should have limited the establishment and control
test utilized by the Supreme Court in Johanns to compelled subsidy cases,
and thus should not have applied it to the specialty license plate context
where neither speech nor financial support is compelled. Different interests
are at stake when a private party is compelled by the government to either
fund or personally endorse someone else’s message, as opposed to when the
government restricts a private party’s ability to speak in a governmentsponsored forum. 253 Therefore, it is inappropriate for courts to apply the
same analysis to compelled subsidy cases as they do to government speech
cases that do not involve compulsion.254 As such, the Fourth Circuit in Tata
should have limited the establishment and control test of Johanns to cases
involving compulsion, and utilized the actual and apparent accountability
test instead.
The potential harm in a compelled subsidy case is a private party being
forced by the government to fund the expression of someone else’s message
with which the private party does not agree.255 This is permissible when the
message is that of the government because it must be able to tax and spend
in order to function. 256 However, the government violates the First
Amendment when it forces a private party to fund another private party’s
expression. 257 Therefore, the government’s establishment of an overarching
message, as was found in Johanns, is particularly important to the determination of constitutionality in compelled subsidy cases.

State thus exercises complete editorial control over the content of the speech on the Choose Life
plate.”).
253. ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 386 (6th Cir. 2006) (Martin, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 381.
255. Id. at 385.
256. Id. at 386.
257. Id. at 385–86.
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The same concern is not present, however, in cases where a private
party is denied access to speak in a government-sponsored forum. In these
cases, the potential “harm is being denied the opportunity to speak on the
same terms as other private citizens within” the forum. 258 Therefore, the
determination of which entity (public or private) established the message is
less important than the determination of which entity is actually communicating the message. If private parties are speaking in a governmentsponsored forum, then the government cannot restrict access to that forum
based on viewpoint; if the government is merely using its own communication channels to express its own view, then it may restrict the expression of
opposing viewpoints through those channels “to ensure that its message is
neither garbled nor distorted.” 259 The actual and apparent accountability
test determines which entity is actually communicating the contested message by examining who has control over its content and dissemination and
who appears to be the literal speaker. 260
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit should have interpreted the Johanns establishment and control test as limited to compelled subsidies cases. Tata
did not involve a compelled subsidy because the North Carolina vehicle
owners were not being forced to pay for the Choose Life plate; rather, they
were petitioning the government for the opportunity to pay for their own
pro-choice plates.261 Thus, the Johanns establishment and control test does
not apply to Tata, or to specialty license plate cases in general. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits correctly interpreted Johanns as being limited to
compelled subsidy (and possibly compelled speech) cases, and therefore
distinguished it from specialty license plate cases.262 The Fourth Circuit in
Tata also correctly noted that Johanns and Summum taken together demonstrate that different factors are relevant in different circumstances when distinguishing government from private speech.263 However, the court did not
go far enough in differentiating the applicability of each of these two cases.
Instead, the court continued to rely on Johanns to support its conclusion
that specialty license plates constitute mixed speech.264 It was an error for

258. Id. at 386.
259. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
260. See supra Part IV.A.
261. See Conti I, 835 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (E.D.N.C. 2011) (“The Individual Plaintiffs are registered automobile owners in the State of North Carolina who desire to purchase a license plate
bearing a message expressing support for a woman’s right to reproductive choice . . . .”).
262. See Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008) (declining to apply
the Johanns analysis to the specialty license plate context, instead finding “the approach of the
Fourth and Ninth Circuits more persuasive”); Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965
(9th Cir. 2008) (finding Johanns to be “factually distinguishable” from, yet “instructive” to, the
specialty license plate context, and applying the four-factor test).
263. ACLU of N.C. v. Tata, 742 F.3d 563, 570–71 (4th Cir. 2014).
264. Id. at 570.
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Johanns to influence the court’s decision in Tata because it is wholly inapplicable to the specialty license plate context.265
V. CONCLUSION
In Tata, the Fourth Circuit determined that the Choose Life plate constituted private speech.266 Therefore, North Carolina engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination by authorizing the issuance of the Choose
Life plate while refusing to issue a pro-choice specialty license plate. 267
Although the court arrived at the correct conclusion in Tata, it did so by
employing the inadequate SCV four-factor test for determining what constitutes government speech. 268 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit incorrectly interpreted Johanns as being relevant outside of the compelled subsidy context, 269 and failed to recognize that Summum makes clear that the two most
important factors in the government speech analysis are the government’s
control over the content and dissemination of the message and the government’s appearance to a reasonable observer as the literal speaker. 270 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit should have taken the opportunity in Tata to remedy
its inconsistent treatment of the government speech doctrine by employing
the actual and apparent accountability test, which utilizes these two factors,
to determine whether the Choose Life plate constituted government
speech. 271 The existence of a simplified and clarified analysis governing
the government speech doctrine would both ensure that the government can
be held accountable for its speech through the political process, and prevent

265. Furthermore, an entirely different concern is present in true compelled speech cases. In
those cases, the right being threatened is not “the right to speak freely [but] the right to refrain
from speaking at all.” Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). The First Amendment
prohibits the government from compelling an individual “personally to express a message he disagrees with,” regardless of the source of the message. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S.
550, 557 (2005). Therefore, the government speech doctrine is wholly inapplicable to such cases.
The compulsion will be held unconstitutional whenever the private party is “‘closely linked with
the expression’ in a way that makes [it] appear to endorse the . . . message.” Id. at 565 n.8 (quoting id. at 575–76 (Souter, J., dissenting)). Accordingly, neither the Johanns establishment and
control test nor the actual and apparent accountability test for determining government speech apply to true compelled speech cases. See id. at 564–65 (declining to address respondents’ argument
because it “relates to compelled speech rather than compelled subsidy”); Tata, 742 F.3d at 570
(“[T]he Supreme Court itself limited its holding [in Johanns] to compelled subsidies, expressly
declining to address as not on point even compelled speech arguments.” (citing Johanns, 544 U.S.
at 564–65)).
266. See supra Part III.
267. See supra Part III.
268. See supra Part IV.
269. See supra Part IV.D.
270. See supra Part IV.B.
271. See supra Part IV.
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the government from improperly relying on the doctrine to suppress disfavored viewpoints in a speech forum. 272

272. See supra Part IV.A.

